基于收益率门槛限制考虑的网格资源拍卖问题

Auction Mechanism of Grid Resource Based on the Limitation of Return Threshold

基于收益率门槛限制的视角,通过建立效用函数模型并结合动态博弈理论,对网格资源的拍卖问题进行了探讨.在对网格资源提供者与竞标网格资源使用者的动态博弈过程进行分析时发现,网格资源提供者的最优策略选择决定于其对货币收益与非货币收益的偏好程度,以及网格资源使用者的最高报价.在收益率门槛给定的条件下,当参与竞标的网格资源使用者具有较低的生产利润或付出较高的努力成本时,网格资源使用者将会选择价格较低的投标策略.研究结果表明收益率门槛机制的引入,在一定程度上可以使得参与双方的效用达到最大化.

Based on the perspective of return threshold, this paper discusses the auction problem of grid resources through establishing the utility function model and combining with the dynamic game theory. With the analysis of the dynamic game process between grid resource providers and users, it finds that the optimal policy choice of the provider depends on its preference for monetary and non-monetary benefits, and the highest quotation of the users. Under the conditions of given return threshold, when the grid resource users have lower production profits or pay a higher cost, they will choose the lower price bidding strategy. The research shows that the introduction of return threshold mechanism can maximize the utility of both parties in a certain degree.