强制与自由:康德法权学说的道德证成

Coercion and Freedom: Kant's Moral Justification on Doctrine of Rights

自由作为根本道德价值固然值得珍视,但是其运用依然需要受到限制甚至强制。遵循普遍的道德法则来保持自由的存在并增进其实现的可能,这一价值取向乃是康德确立法权学说的根本出发点。道德命令(分别表现为法权义务和德性义务)乃是为了确保每个人的自由与其他任何人的自由都能够在普遍原则之下得以存续和提升,所有人因此能够在一定的限制条件下自由追寻合理的目的。尽管道德法则在具体运用中呈现出外在强制和自我限制的双重面向,但是基于"融贯论"的解读方式,康德法权学说及其蕴含的强制性特征直接源于普遍性的道德命令和人自身即是目的这一价值旨趣,进而为维护和增进自由价值确立前提条件。在此意义上,纯粹实践理性及其表征的自由价值乃是证成法权原则的规范性前提,也区别于经由慎思理性确立权利和主权原则的社会契约论传统。质疑此完备性自由主义思路的"分离论"观点割裂了个体自主和公共自主的关联,从而难以展现康德道德形而上学的完整形态和根本意图,也会导致在政治正当性论证中出现诸多缺失。

Although freedom is the fundamental value, its exercise should be restricted or coerced. Maintaining freedom and promoting the possibility of its realization in accordance with universal law, this commitment is the basic standpoint of Kant＇s thought. The aim of moral imperatives （duty of right and duty of virtue） is to protect the consistence and promotion of freedom under the universal law, and everyone can pursue their reasonable ends with certain constraints. Although the exercise of moral law can be represented with inner restriction and outer coercion, Kant＇s doctrine and its feature of coercion is derived directly from the universal moral imperatives and the value of human being as end by itself based on the coherent interpretation, then provide the assumption for maintaining and promoting the value of freedom. In this thinking way, the pure practical reason and its value orientation of freedom is the the normative condition for justifying the principles of right, and it also distinguish from the traditional social contract doctrines and the theory of natural law.