休谟人格同一性理论中的真正问题

The Real Problem in Hume's Account of Personal Identity

在《人性论》的附录中,休谟称自己在《人性论》第一卷中对人格同一性的说明"很有缺点",他的"全部希望都消逝了。"休谟发现的是怎样一个严重的问题?Yumiko Inukai和Galen Strawson新近对这个问题给出了新的回答,但他们都没有抓住真正困扰休谟的问题。休谟人格同一性理论中的真正问题在于:休谟对人格同一性的说明必须依靠一个与一束特殊知觉不同的自我观念,而受制于休谟自己坚持的经验主义原则,他并不能提供这样一个自我观念。

In the Appendix to A Treatise of Human Nature, Hume confesses that the account of personal identity that he offered in Book I of the Treatise ＂is very defective＂ and that all his hopes ＂vanish＇. What is the serious problem that Hume detects in his former account of personal identity that leads all his hopes to vanish？ In this paper, I critically evaluate the recent answers given by Yumiko Inukai and Galen Strawson and show that both of them ha- ven＇ t found the real problem that perplexes Hume. I argue that the real source of Hume＇ s despair lies in the fact that his account of personal identity cru- cially depends on an idea of the self different from a mere bundle of perceptions, while such an idea of the self is forbidden by his empirical principles.