摘要
在休谟"应—是"问题的启发下,摩尔首创"自然主义谬误"术语,旨在反道德自然主义进路。在此基础上,弗兰克纳进一步区分了"逻辑谬误"和"定义谬误"。摩尔认为形而上学的谬误也是自然主义谬误的诱因,只是他将"善"的自然主义谬误延伸到形而上学的范畴,进而引发伦理学的宗教教权唯一性的争论,对此古尔德通过宗教和科学的权二分观点予以回应,但遭到进化伦理学者的反对,进而出现反自然主义谬误思潮,试图为进化伦理学辩护,但进化论在解释道德进化上仍显不足。
Hume's discussion on the problem of "should - be", "naturalistic fallacy" is first created by Moore aimed at anti - moral naturalism approach. On this basis, Frankena further distinguishes between "logical fallacy" and "definitive fallacy". Moore argues that metaphysical fallacy can also lead to naturalistic fallacy, but it extends the naturalistic fallacy of "goodness" to the category of metaphysics, thus causing the debate on the uniqueness of reli- gious authority in ethics. Gould, as a philosopher of biology, makes a response by addressing the dichotomy between religious and scientific authority. This view has been attacked by evolutionary ethics. With the emergence of anti - naturalist fallacy, it attempts to defend evolutionary ethics but there are still shortcomings in explaining the evolution of morality from the theory of evolution.
出处
《自然辩证法研究》
CSSCI
北大核心
2017年第5期15-19,共5页
Studies in Dialectics of Nature
基金
国家社会科学基金项目"进化认识论EEM纲领的理论进展及其方法论意蕴研究"(15CZX014)