不对称信息下考虑供应中断和延期交货的采购合同设计

Procurement Contract Design Considering Supply Disruption and Delay in Delivery under Asymmetric Information

研究不对称信息下供应商供应中断和延期交货两类风险对制造商采购决策的影响。运用采购机制设计理论与方法,分析了制造商最优采购合同及供应商最优生产决策。结果表明:1)供应商生产数量和交货提前期应分别用中断罚金和延期罚金规制;2)供应商有关供应可靠性的私有信息使高类型供应商的两类罚金均增加,交货提前期缩短;同时,低类型供应商的中断罚金减小,延期罚金和交货提前期不受影响;3)信息不对称不一定降低社会福利。

In order to explore the impact of supply disruption risk and delay m delivery on me manutactm^t ~ p^L,~,tu decisions under asymmetric information, the manufacturer＇s optimal procurement contracts and supplier＇s optimal production decisions are analyzed, by employing the theory and methodology of procurement mechanism design. The results show that： 1） the manufacturer should regulate the production quantity and lead time of the supplier by designing penalty for non-delivery and for delay in delivery, respectively. 2） Given supplier＇s private information about supply reliability, the high type supplier receives higher penalties for non-delivery and delay in delivery than in the case of symmetric information, shortening the optimal lead time. In contrast, the low type supplier obtains lower penalty for non- delivery, and the penalty for delay in delivery is not affected by information asymmetry, leading to unchanged lead time decision. 3） Information asymmetry does not necessarily decrease social welfare.