契约不完全制度环境下的比较优势演化机制

Evolution Mechanism of Comparative Advantage in the Institutional Environment that Contract Is Incomplete

根据新制度经济学理论,加强支持契约执行和纵向一体化的制度供给,有助于企业节约交易成本,进而提升综合成本优势。通过对产业链主体博弈关系及最终品期望价格函数的推导,考察了支持契约执行及纵向一体化的制度变量与产品价格优势的量化关系,发现前者对违约行为构成事前约束,后者对违约发生后陷入过度谈判构成事后约束,因此二者都有利于增进成本优势。同时,这两种制度变量对成本优势的作用均在资产专用性与规模优势相匹配的部门中更为有效。因此,中国应优先为这类行业创造良好的契约执行和纵向一体化的外部环境,对于小型高技术企业和大型中低端制造企业,应首先支持其内部技术结构和规模边界的优化调整,提高其利用外部制度因素的能力。

According to theories of new institutional economics, strengthening institutional supply to support both con- tract enforcement and vertical integration will be helpful to save transaction costs for enterprises, hence the promotion of comprehensive cost advantage. By deducing game relationships among subjects of industry chain and expectation price function of final products, this paper investigates the quantified relationship between institution variables that support contract enforcement as well as vertical integration and price advantages of products, finding that the former can be the ex - ante constraint for breaches of contract while the latter can be the ex - post constraint for excessive negotiations after breaches, so the two are equally helpful to increase cost advantage. Meanwhile, the impacts the two kinds of institution variables have on cost advantage are more effective in departments where asset specificity coincides with scale advantage. Consequently, China should preferentially create the fight environment for this kind of industries where they can be guar- anteed by contract enforcement and vertical integration. For small high -tech enterprises and large low -end manufac- turing enterprises, China should first support optimizing and adjusting their internal technology structure and scale boundary, enhancing their capability of using external institutional factors.