会计信息质量、政治关联与公司债融资成本——基于我国上市公司的证据

The Quality of Accounting Information,Political Connections and the Cost of Corporate Bonds:An Empirical Study Based on Chinese Listed Companies

政治关联作为一种非制度性因素,会影响市场在资源配置中所起的作用。公司债是一种市场化程度较高的直接融资方式,其融资成本受多种因素的影响。本文以2007年9月至2015年7月我国上市公司发行的公司债为研究对象,探究会计信息质量和政治关联对公司债融资成本的影响。结果表明:较高的会计信息质量有利于降低公司债融资成本;公司所拥有的政治关联可以削弱债券投资者对会计信息质量的要求并降低债券融资成本,并且在市场化程度越低的地区,政治关联的削弱作用越明显,即政治关联在债券融资中具有隐性担保的作用。因此,进一步提高我国债券市场的市场化程度,加强市场信息披露机制建设,对促进我国债券市场的发展和降低企业融资成本具有积极意义。

As a non-systematic factor,political connection can affect the way how market determines the resource allocation.And as a highly market-oriented process,the cost of corporate bonds is affected by many factors.This article analyzes how the quality of accounting information and political connections influence the cost of corporate bonds based on a sample of Chinese listed companies from 2007 to 2015.By using a series of empirical approach,we find that the quality of accounting information can decrease the cost of corporate bonds.However,the political connections can weaken the position of accounting information in determining the above cost and these mechanisms are more pronounced in the area which has made less achievement in the process of marketization.All these results show that political connections serve as an implicit guarantee in debt financing,which is far different from the purpose of setting the corporate debt market.So enhancing the degree of debt market marketization and improving the information disclosure mechanisms can have positive significance on promoting the development of our debt market and decreasing the cost of corporate financing.