摘要
以融资约束差异和代理成本理论为基础,基于我国特殊的制度背景,将宏观层面的金融市场化进程和微观层面的公司管理者权力结合来研究上市公司的投资效率。研究发现:管理者权力并没有使投资效率得到改善,金融市场化程度的提高也没有使管理者权力与投资效率关系得到显著改善,投资效率低下反而还有继续扩大的趋势。研究成果为解读我国上市公司"高投资—低效率"现象、丰富财务理论和公司治理理论提供了新的经验证据。
This article studies the investment efficiency of listed companies combining macroscopic financial development with micro ad- ministrator power, based on the special institutional background in China, according to the theory of difference of financing constraints by heterogeneous property right structure and agency cost theory. Results show that manager' s power does not improve investment effi- ciency, and the improvement of financial marketization does not promote the relationship between managers power and investment effi- ciency, instead inefficient investments continue to expand. It provides a new empirical evidence to interpret the phenomenon of "high investment, low efficiency" of listed companies and to enrich financial theory and corporate governance theory.
出处
《经济经纬》
CSSCI
北大核心
2017年第3期111-116,共6页
Economic Survey
基金
国家社会科学基金项目(14BGL037)
关键词
金融市场化
管理者权力
资本配置效率
Financial Marketization
Administrator Power
Allocation Efficiency of Capital