战略性新兴产业公司治理、研发投入延迟效应与企业绩效关系研究

Corporate Governance,the Delayed Effect of R&D Investment and Corporate Performance in the Strategic Emerging Industries

以1 038家战略性新兴产业上市公司2013-2015年的数据为样本,考察了公司治理、研发投入延迟效应与企业绩效之间的关系。研究结果表明:董事长与CEO两职兼任能够有效促进企业研发资金投入,董事会规模和独立董事比例与企业研发投入没有显著相关关系;股权集中度没有对研发投入带来显著的积极作用,机构持股与研发投入之间没有显著相关关系,股权制衡对企业研发投入具有正向影响;薪酬激励、高管持股和在职消费对企业研发投入均具有显著促进作用;企业研发投入具有延迟效应,对当期和后续绩效分别具有负向和正向影响。从新视角研究战略性新兴产业的研发创新活动,为构建匹配产业创新特征的治理结构提供了参考。

The felationship among corporate govrnance,the delayed effect of R＆D and corporate performance isinvestigated with the sample of 1038 listed companies in strategic emerging ixidtistries during 2013-2015. The empirical evidence supports the following conclusions. Firsts chairman and CEO cancurrency can effectively promote R＆D investment; board size,the percentage of independent directors has no significant correlation. Secondly,the eonceritration of own-ership has not played a gignificailtly positive role,institutional ownership has no significant correlation with R＆D investment,and equity balance promotes enterprise R＆D. Thirdly,executive compensation,equity incentive and tke on- the-job eDnsufflptiaii are all positively rfelated to R＆D investment. Finally,R＆D investment has tke delayed effect,and hai negative and positive impact respeetrrely on the current and subsequent performance. The paper explores the R＆D activities of strategic emerging industries from new perspective, and provides reference for the governance structure to match the innovation characteriities.