摘要
以"物流服务提供商-集成商-顾客"与"物流服务提供商-顾客"构成的物流服务双渠道为研究对象,构建了以提供商为领导者,集成商为追随者的斯塔克尔伯格博弈模型。在渠道协调与利润最大化的驱使下,从集成商补偿与顾客补偿两个角度研究了补偿策略对双渠道供应链的影响,比较分析了不同补偿机制对优惠传递效率与提供商利润最大化的影响,得到提供商补偿机制的选择策略。最后利用数值分析方法对模型和结论进行了验证。研究发现,提供商不仅可以通过合理利用电子渠道来缓解横向渠道冲突,还可以基于需求交叉弹性与服务折扣兑换率的变化进行补偿策略选择,从而更有效地缓解纵向渠道冲突。
By taking the logistics service dual channel as a research object, which is formed with the logistics service provider-the integrator-the customer and the logistics service provider-customer, the Stackelberg game model is constructed with the provider as the leader, and the integrator as the follower. Driven by the channel coordination and the profit maximization, this paper analyzes the influence of compensation strategy on the dual channel supply chain from the perspectives of the integrator compensation and the customer compensation, and the influence of the different compensation mechanisms on the privilege transmission efficiency and the profit- maximization of the logistics service provider are comparatively analyzed so as to obtain selection strategies of compensation mechanisms. Finally, the numerical analysis is used to verify the model and conclusions. It finds that the provider not only can remit the horizontal channel conflict with the rational utilization of E-chan- nel, but also can remit the vertical channel conflict by choosing the compensation strategies based on the change of the demand cross elasticity and the service-discounts exchange rate.
基金
浙江省哲学社会科学规划项目(13NDJC038YB)
