中美证券法公共执行机制比较研究——基于监管机构投入产出的实证分析

A Comparison of the Public Enforcement Regime in China and the US:An Empirical Analysis of the Inputs and Outputs of the Public Regulators

证券法的公共执行机制一直是"法律与金融"理论探讨的热点问题。本文收集了2011年至2015年间中美两国证券监管者执法投入和产出的数据,对比分析了美国"多头执法"模式和我国"集中执法"模式。从投入角度来看,我国证监会执法投入呈现上升趋势,但仍然面临资源投入不足、配置不合理、执法人员缺乏激励等问题。从产出角度来看,虽然证监会通过向证监局分权,显著增加了公共执法的强度,但是我国证券违法者被定罪的概率和受到的处罚力度仍处于较低水平。可以通过引入经济激励机制、提高公众监督水平、增加罚没收入的返还力度等措施,提高我国公共执法机制的效率。

The public enforcement of securities law has been actively discussed in the lawand-finance theory.This paper collects the data on inputs and outputs of the securities regulators in China and the US from 2011 to 2015 and compares the ＂centralized enforcement model＂and ＂decentralized enforcement model＂in the two nations.The regulatory inputs are increasing steadily in China,but Chinese securities regulators still face the challenges of insufficient budgets and staffing resources,misallocation of regulatory resources and weak enforcement incentives.From the perspective of regulatory outputs,China Securities Regulatory Commission raises the enforcement outputs through delegating more authority to its regional offices,which significantly increases the enforcement intensity in Chinese securities markets.But the probability of conviction and the magnitude of sanctions remain relatively low.To improve the efficiency of public enforcement,regulatory reforms that offer appropriate incentives to regulators,encourage public monitoring,and reimburse more fines and penalties to harmed investors could be introduced.