摘要
选取2010-2015年A股的上市公司作为样本,以企业的净利润作为衡量业绩的指标,实证检验了我国上市公司高管薪酬粘性的存在性,并考察了企业的股权结构对于高管薪酬粘性的影响机制。研究结果显示:高管薪酬与企业业绩间存在明显的不对称,说明高管会通过盈余管理的手段来保证自身利益最大化,降低薪酬业绩敏感度。进一步分组检验,发现大股东持股对于高管薪酬粘性有促进作用,而股权制衡能够显著地抑制高管薪酬粘性。
Selecting all A -share companies during the year 2010 -2915 as samples and enterprise＇s net profit as a measure of performance index, we tried to indicate the existence of executive compensation stickiness in the listed companies and the impact of corporate ownership structure on them. The results show that： there is an obvious asymmetry between the executive compensation and the corporate performance, which means that the executives will maximize their own interests by means of earnings management. It is concluded that the holdings of majority shareholders play a positive role in promoting the executive pay stickiness and the equity balances can significantly inhibit the executive pay stickiness.
出处
《黑龙江工业学院学报（综合版）》
2017年第5期62-68,共7页
Journal of Heilongjiang University of Technology(Comprehensive Edition)
关键词
业绩敏感性
薪酬粘性
股权结构
： performance sensitivity
pay stickiness
ownership structure
