公共预算决策及时性的动态均衡分析

Dynamic Equilibrium Analysis on the Timeliness of Public Budget Decision

公共预算决策的及时性是政府善政和国家治理能力的重要体现。本文基于前景理论,构建了预算决策的"双群体"静态和动态前景博弈模型,以全面透析和模拟预算决策的真实世界。研究表明,预算决策及时与否与预算偏离度、决策者的支出偏好、损失厌恶程度以及延迟成本密切相关。为避免预算延迟,应制定有利于平滑收入波动的预算制度,重点加强极端财政状况时期的预算管理和控制;引导决策者形成一致的支出偏好,并适当延长决策层的任期;建立预算决策奖惩激励机制以及信息网络共享平台。

The timely decision-making of the public budget is the important manifestation of the government＇s good governance and the capacity of national governance. Based on the prospect theory, this paper constructs the ＂double-group＂ static and dynamic prospect game models, so as to fully analyze and simulate the real world of budget decisions. The results show that whether the budget decision is timely or not is related to budget deviation, decision-maker＇s preference, loss aversion and delay cost. To avoid budget delays, a budget system should be developed to smooth the fluctuations of income, with emphasis on budget management and control during periods of extreme fiscal conditions;decision-makers should be guided to form consistent spending preferences and to extend the leader＇s tenure;and the budgetary incentives mechanism and information network sharing platform should also be established.