高阶梯队理论视角下控制权对不同背景领导者与研发投入间关系的调节机制

Moderating Effect of Control Right on Relationship between TMT's Functional Background and R&D Expenditure under Upper Echelons Theory

从高阶理论和委托-代理理论出发,利用2007—2015年中国沪深两市上市公司公开披露的数据,考察了实际控制人的控制权、具有不同专业背景的领导者与研发投入的关系,厘清了控制权对具有不同专业背景的领导者对研发投入影响的作用机制。实证结果表明,控制权是具有不同专业背景的领导者与研发投入之间的调节变量。具体而言:具有技术背景的领导者对研发投入的影响随着实际控制人控制权的增大而减小;具有社科背景的领导者对研发投入的影响随着实际控制人控制权的增大而增大。

Engineering leaders are more convinced that R＆-D could promote innovation, and technique than, any other kinds of leaders. Leaders such as chairmen, of board and CEOs influence firmfs decision, profoundly. This paper explores the interaction, effect between. R＆-D expenditure decision, and enterprise^ control right by using the panel data of listed companies from 2007 to 2015. The results indicates as follows： control right moderates the relationship between. R＆-D expenditure and leadersf different functional backgrounds; technical leadersf enthusiasm on. R＆-D expenditure would be weaken, by control right while sociological leaderfs negative attitude on. R＆-D would be improved. It clarifies the inversion, mechanism between, echelon, theory and agent theory,and puts forward some useful advices for corporate governance and some possible advices for decision, making.