信息不对称下的农地流转“柠檬”市场困境——以黑龙江省西城村例证

Study on “Lemon” Market Dilemma of Farmland Circulation Market under Information Asymmetry——A Case Study in Xicheng Village,Heilongjiang Province

新型农业经营模式构建背景下,农地大规模流转成为必然,其核心问题是价格。以黑龙江省克山县西城村为例,基于Akerlof经典理论,探究信息不对称下的农地流转市场交易边界、均衡条件及其逆向选择问题。结果表明,政府参与农地流转在激发农户农地流转积极性、提高农地流转效率、促进农地适度规模经营等方面发挥了积极作用。在信息不对称市场环境下,政府定价对农地流转市场的干预和扭曲作用日益凸显,导致农地流转实际价格低于市场机制运行下的应然价格,引发逆向选择市场行为,农地流转市场陷入"柠檬"困境,价格倒逼机制导致农地质量下降成为趋势,产生具有恶性传导效应的市场效率损失。提出利用外来资本及价格信号显示机制,构建公开市场条件下的农地流转价格体系将有助于推动农地有序流转。

Under the background of building a new type of agricultural management mode,large-scale farmland circulation becomes inevitable and its core problem is renting price.Based on the case study in Xicheng village,Keshan county of Helongjiang province and Akerlof theory,this paper analyzes the transaction boundary of farmland circulation market under asymmetric information as well as equilibrium condition and its adverse selection in order to provide a new perspective to promote orderly and sustainable farmland circulation.Government’s participation in farmland circulation is playing an important role in arousing farmer’s enthusiasm in farmland circulation,increasing the efficiency of farmland circulation and promoting the moderate operation of farmland.Under the environment of information asymmetry,intervention and distorting effect of setting price by government are increasingly prominent in which the actual price is lower than the proper price under market mechanism operation,which causes'adverse selection'market behavior,and farmland circulation market falls into'lemon'difficulties.Price forced mechanism leads to the decrease of farmland quality which results in the loss of market efficiency with malignant conduction effect.Therefore,this paper proposes that taking advantage of foreign capital and signal display mechanism of renting price to construct farmland circulation price system under the open market conditions will promote the orderly farmland circulation.