金字塔控股结构与终极控制者隧道效应研究

Research on Pyramid Shareholding Structures and Ultimate Controller's Tunneling Effect

随着我国股权分置改革的完成,终极控股股东对中小股东与上市公司利益的侵占行为呈现出与股权分置改革前诸多不同的特点。基于后股权分置时期2008-2014年连续存在的343家上市家族公司的平衡面板数据,本文应用个体固定效应回归模型分析终极控制者的控制权、现金流权、两权分离度、股权制衡度、控制层级与隧道效应的关系,发现各因素对隧道效应的影响在不同家族企业之间呈现显著差异;隧道效应与终极控制人拥有的控制权比例显著正相关,与现金流权比例显著负相关,与两权分离度显著正相关;外部股东的存在未能有效遏制隧道行为,低负债率的资产结构助长了隧道挖掘动机。因此,应构建低控制权、低现金流权的"双低"股权结构,从权力根源上避免隧道挖掘行为。

With the completion of nontradable shares reform, the uhimate controller＇s encroachment on the interests of minority shareholders and listed companies shows a lot of different characteristics compared with the share structure before the reform. Based on balance panel data of 343 listed family companies which have been continuously operating during the Post-Non-Tradable Share Period of 2008-2014, the paper uses individual fixed effects regression model to study the relationship between ultimate control rights, cash flow right, the separation of two rights, equity balance, control layer and tunneling effect, finding the effects of various factors on the tunneling effect show significant differences in different fami- ly companies ; tunneling effect is in significantly positive correlation with the proportion of control rights and the separation of two rights, while is in significantly negative correlation with cash flow right; the existence of outside shareholders can＇t effectively curb the tunneling behavior, and low debt assets structure encourages the tunneling incentive. Therefore, it is necessary to construct the ownership structure with low control right and low cash flow right to avoid the tunneling behavior from the power source.