摘要
高可比性信息有助于提高投资者觉察管理层隐藏坏消息的能力,同时更可比的会计信息也有助于约束管理层的盈余管理行为。本文基于2003~2013年A股上市公司样本,借鉴De Franco等(2011)度量会计信息可比性的方法,检验了会计信息可比性与股价崩盘风险之间的关系。经验证据发现,会计信息可比性与股价崩盘风险之间显著负相关。进一步地,基于我国股票市场的涨跌停制度,我们根据跌停次数度量真实发生的股价崩盘,发现会计信息可比性与未来股价跌停的次数显著负相关,这意味着提高会计信息可比性是降低未来股价崩盘的重要机制。本文的研究对政策制定者、管理层以及投资者都具有启示意义。
Accounting information comparability is conductive to improve the ability of investors identifying bad information sheltered by management, and meanwhile, is helpful to restrain management earnings manipulation. Based on the data of A-share market from 2003 to 2013, this paper investigates the relationship between crash risk and accounting information comparability developed by De Franco et al. (2011). The results show that accounting information comparability is significantly negative with future crash risk. Moreover, we measure the real collapse in the share price using the number of Down Limit according to Price Limit system, and we find accounting information comparability is significantly negative with the number of Down Limit, which means improving accounting information comparability is an important mechanism for firms to reduce the risk of the share price collapse. Our research is meaningful to policymakers, managers and investors.
出处
《财务研究》
2017年第3期65-75,共11页
Finance Research
基金
国家自然科学基金项目(71502115)
深圳大学人文社会科学青年教师扶持项目(15QNFC07)
关键词
会计信息可比性
股价崩盘风险
隐藏坏消息
accounting information comparability
crash risk
hide bad information