互联网金融与传统银行业的博弈——基于双寡头垄断市场的三阶段差异性Hotelling模型研究

Games between E-finance and Traditional Banking——Based on a Three-stage Difference Hotelling Model under Double Oligarch Monopolization

当前我国储户存贷业务的竞争可近似看成是互联网金融模式和传统银行业模式的双寡头垄断市场格局,而对此进行定量系统性学术探讨的既有研究并不多见。本文构建了一个差异性的Hotelling模型,分三阶段博弈过程定量剖析了这两种模式的差异性及其主要影响因素。研究结果表明:在互联网金融模式初始进入阶段,其通过制定足够的低价以规避传统银行业模式高服务成本的软肋抢占市场份额;在互联网金融模式崛起后的竞争阶段,其致力于用户电子支付粘性的培育以稳固市场份额,传统银行业模式则通过设置高转移成本障碍以应对;在互联网金融模式和传统银行业模式的共赢阶段,其分别选择成本导向型和质量导向型的服务创新战略进行差异化竞争。这对进一步深化和革新金融市场秩序,提出具体建设性的监管举措具有与时俱进的实践指导价值。

The current competition of savings deposits and loans for our depositors can be approximated as a double oligarch monopolization pattern between traditional banking and E-financial models.But few people conduct a quantitative systematic academic study to this pattern.This paper constructs a difference Hotelling model which contains a traditional banking model and an E-financial model,and discusses their differences and main factors quantitatively from three stages.The results show that：in the initial phase of E-financial model,it can occupy market share through a low enough price,and avoid the weakness of high cost of traditional banking model.In the competition stage of E-financial model,it commits to push the users to use electronic payment so that it can get a steady and solid market share.Traditional banking model responds to it by setting high switching costs.In the win-win phase of traditional banking and E-financial model,they respectively choose quality-oriented and cost-oriented service innovation strategy to carry out differentiation competition.It is suggested that it is necessary to keep up with the times to deepen financial market order and propose constructive regulatory initiatives.