质量视角下生猪供应链契约治理研究

Study on Contractual Governance of Live Pig Supply Chain:A Quality Perspective

基于信息不对称下的机会主义行为导致猪肉质量安全事故这一事实,研究了生猪供应链质量激励契约治理。通过构建生猪供应链的内部质量惩罚、外部质量损失分担及内外质量损失分担契约模型,证明质量激励契约治理的有效性。通过数值模拟进行契约敏感性分析,结果表明:内外质量损失分担契约更符合猪肉行业长期发展的需求;当消费者索赔提高时,若质量边际成本较高,宜采用内部质量惩罚契约引导质量行为;第三方机构的检测精度影响着外部质量损失分担和内外质量损失分担契约的治理效果。

In this paper, in view of the fact that the opportunistic behaviors under information asymmetry would cause pork quality related accidents, we studied the quality incentive and contractual governance of the live pig supply chain. First, through building the internal quality penalty model, external quality loss sharing model and internal/external quality loss sharing contractual model, we proved the validity of the quality incentive and contractual governance. Then through numerical simulation, we had a sensitivity analysis of the contract which concluded that the internal/external quality loss sharing contract could better fit the long-term development demand of the pork industry; when consumer claims were raised and if the quality marginal cost was relatively high, the internal quality penalty contract could be utilized to guide the quality behaviors of the supply chain enterprises; and the inspection accuracy of third party institutions would affect the effectiveness of the external quality loss sharing contract and the internal/external quality loss sharing contract.