有多个维特根斯坦吗?——评彼得·哈克和丹妮尔·莫亚-夏洛克的“第三阶段维特根斯坦”之争被引量：4

Are There Many Wittgensteins?——Debate on the“Third”Wittgenstein Between Peter M. S. Hacker and D. Moyal-Sharrock

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摘要 "多个"维特根斯坦观念对理解维特根斯坦的哲学会造成诸多误解和争论。文章主要关注哈克和莫亚-夏洛克有关"第三阶段的维特根斯坦"之争。基于哈克的整体式观点,主要反驳"多个"维特根斯坦概念:它们自身就存在着各种张力。"多个"维特根斯坦像"数维特根斯坦"游戏,它形成的原因是,学界普遍存在的对维特根斯坦哲学阶段的分期、阐释者对其不同理解以及"三个维特根斯坦学派"和"三种阐释方法"的争论。最后,提出"一个维特根斯坦"及其哲学延续性观念,并指出魏斯曼的有阐释著作在理解"中期"维特根斯坦哲学工作中的重要性。 The concept of ＇many Wittgensteins＇ has caused various misunderstandings and debates between Witt- genstein interpreters. In this paper, the author reviews the debate between Hacker and Moyal-Sharrock concerning The Third Wittgenstein. Based on Hacker＇ s ＇ holistic＇ view of Wittgenstein＇ s philosophy and the periodization of his philosophical development, the author repudiates the notion of ＇ many Wittgensteins. ＇ The author argues that there are many contradictions about the notions themselves. By proposing any of these concepts, we are playing the game of counting Wittgenstein. The author advances two reasons for the emergence of these interpretations on Witt- genstein. First, there are various opinions on the periodization of Wittgenstein＇ s philosophical development. Sec- ond, these views stem from the disagreements between ＇Three Wittgenstein Interpretation Schools＇ and the corre- sponding ＇ Three approaches to Interpreting Wittgenstein. ＇ In response to these disagreements, the author advances a notion of ＇ one Wittgenstein＇ and the continuity of Wittgenstein＇ s philosophy, and identifies the significance of Waismann＇ s philosophy in understanding Wittgenstein＇ s philosophy during his period of transition.

作者徐强桑田

机构地区武汉大学哲学学院维多利亚大学哲学系肇庆学院外国语学院

出处《科学技术哲学研究》 CSSCI 北大核心 2017年第3期43-49,共7页 Studies in Philosophy of Science and Technology

基金国家社科基金一般项目"开明的自然主义研究"(16BZX020)

关键词 “第三阶段”维特根斯坦哈克莫亚-夏洛克 “一个维特根斯坦” the ＂third＂ Wittgenstein Hacker Moyal-Sharrock one Wittgenstein

分类号 B561 [哲学宗教—外国哲学]

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参考文献2

1楼巍.轴心命题与知识——第三阶段的维特根斯坦与知识论重塑[J].哲学研究,2012(1):91-97. 被引量：5
2徐强.魏斯曼论“实指定义”[J].自然辩证法研究,2016,32(4):3-8. 被引量：9

二级参考文献35

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