矿-粮复合区生态补偿主体多阶段信号传递博弈研究

Analysis on the Multistage Dynamic Games Theory of the Ecological Compensation's Stakeholders in Mine-Grain Mixed Zone

通过厘清利益相关者之间的关系,探寻矿-粮复合区生态补偿各方利益主体博弈的均衡条件。研究方法:基于多阶段信号传递博弈和逆向回归推导方法对矿企、地方政府、农户等三个主体在生态补偿中的利益倾向及关系进行分析。研究结果:(1)在第一阶段事中博弈中因认知时滞因素三方利益可达到短期均衡。(2)农户由上访等方式使上级政府作为中立机构介入,加大监察力度可使矿企的寻租可行性降低。研究结论:(1)建立健全环境污染相关制度,从法制角度加以约束矿企的污染行为以及补偿行为;(2)加强地方政府及其公职人员的纪检监察程度有利于生态补偿渠道畅通;(3)对农户大力宣传生态污染知识、法律常识教育以提升农户监督能力,提高其在生态补偿活动中的参与程度,降低生态污染事件发生频率。

The purpose of this study is to explore the multistage games equilibrium conditions in ecological compensation in thefield of mine-grain mixed zone. It analyzed interest bias and the relationship among government, mining enterprise and farmersby the method of multi-stage signaling game with incomplete information and approach of backwards induction. The researchresults contain two parts. On one hand, the stakeholders can reach the temporary game equilibrium in the first stage of gamebecause there is a recognition time lag. On the other hand, superior government enter the game process as intermediary agentbecause of farmers＇ petition, the probability of mining enterprises＇ rent-seeking may reduce with punishment. The conclusionsare： Firstly, It is essential to set up a related law system of environmental pollution to restrain them with miner＇s pollutionbehavior and compensation behavior. Secondly, strengthening the supervision to local government and officers is benefit toecological compensation. Thirdly, strengthening the farmers＇ education can improve oversight capability in order to induce theprobability of ecological pollution. The educational content consists of ecological pollution knowledge and legal knowledge.