媒体参与食品安全社会共治的条件与策略

The Condition and Strategy of Media Participating in Food Safety Social Co-governance

现有研究多从理性假设出发探讨媒体参与食品安全治理的作用,鲜有探讨媒体参与食品安全治理的具体条件和情境。本文构建有限理性假设条件下的媒体与食品生产经营者的不完全信息动态博弈模型,研究表明,媒体参与食品安全社会共治有三个重要约束条件:一是生产经营者感知声誉损失的敏感程度,二是媒体参与社会共治的主观价值判断,三是政府需要对监管保持常态化而非"运动式"监管处罚。因此,媒体参与食品安全社会共治的主要策略有四:(1)社会声誉机制是媒体参与社会共治的重要前提,除惩罚和问责外,监管者还可采取判罚违规者社会服务令等多种方式提高社会声誉机制的有效性;(2)媒体对食品安全违规行为或事件进行持续跟踪调查或深度报道,而非"运动式"报道或采访;(3)媒体参与食品安全社会共治既需要权威媒体介入,也需要新媒体介入,形成全覆盖的媒体监督体系,才会对违规生产行为构成足够震慑;(4)媒体参与社会共治的监督尽可能采取媒体群体监督的模式,既需要从体制和社会责任感上建立制度和规则来参与,也需要从选拔合适的媒体记者角度来参与社会共治。

The existing literature often starts from the rational behavior assumption to discuss the value of media participating in the food safety governance, but seldom discusses the condition and strategy media participating in food safety. This paper develops a dynamic game theory model of media and food safety firm based on the bounded rational behavior assumption. Result shows that the condition of media participating in food safety social co-governance includes three parts： the level of reputation sensitivity of food firm, the judge of media and the punishment of government regulation. As a result, the strategy of media participating in food safety social co-governance is as follows ： （1） The social reputation of media is the condition of media participating in co-governance, so that government can use other methods to maintain the social reputation institution; （2） The style of media reporting food safety violation behavior should be constant and deep, rather than just transient. （3） Both traditional media and new media should participate in food safety social co-governance, so that media can deter the violation of food safety ; （4） Government should develop a media supervision system so that media participation can become legal and more qualified reporters would participate in this area.