考虑供应链成员公平关切的双渠道供应链合作广告策略

Cooperative Advertising Strategy in a Dual Channel Supply Chain with Members' Fairness Concern

研究由1个开设直销渠道的制造商和1个零售商组成的双渠道供应链中,零售商为市场竞争的主导者,制造商为随从者且双方均具有公平关切行为、两方进行合作广告的策略问题。以制造商和零售商均无公平关切行为为基准,研究了双方均具有公平关切行为和只有一方有公平关切行为等多种情形。研究表明:仅有制造商有公平关切行为时,制造商以及整个渠道的利润会增加且渠道效率会有所改善,但会使零售商的利润减少,然而零售商采取合作广告的利润仍大于其采取非合作广告的利润;而仅有零售商有公平关切行为时,供应链成员以及供应链总利润都会减少,但零售商的效用却可能会大于无公平关切时的利润,并且当其自身公平关切行为程度较高时,采取合作广告策略可能会损害自身利润。

We consider a distribution channel with a single manufacturer and a single retailer, where the manufacturer uses dual-channel strategy and both agents have fairness concern. We assume that the channel members adopt cooperative advertising strategy, and study four cases as follows- neither channel members has fairness concern, both agents are fair-minded, only the manufacturer or the retailer is fair- minded. We show that the manufacturer＇s fairness concerns may increase the profit of him and the entire supply chain, and the channel efficiency rises up as well. At the same time, the retailer＇s profit decreases, but still more than the profit under non-cooperative scenario. However, the retailer＇s fairness concern may decrease the profits of the two agents and the entire supply chain, but her profit may increase. Furthermore, when the retailer＇s fairness concern is higher, she will not choose cooperative advertising strategy with the manufacturer.