政府不同策略下报废汽车正规与非正规回收渠道博弈模型

Game Model for End-of-Life Vehicles between Formal Recycling Channels and Informal Recycling Channel based on Governmental Different Policies

为了分析政府不同政策对报废汽车回收渠道的影响,建立了正规回收渠道与非正规回收渠道博弈模型。基于此模型,考虑政府不采取政策、采取对正规回收渠道进行补贴政策及采取对非正规渠道进行监管政策的3种情况。对比分析了3种情况下,政府补贴及监管努力程度对单位回收价格、回收量、利润及环境的影响。研究表明:(1)政府采取补贴政策时,正规渠道与非正规渠道都会提高单位回收价格;政府采取监管政策时,正规渠道降低单位回收价格,非正规渠道提高单位回收价格;(2)政府不同政策对单位回收价格、回收量、利润及环境的影响与政府补贴额、监管努力程度、单位回收价格敏感度系数及监管努力程度系数有关。

This paper establishes a game model between the formal recycling channel and the informal recycling channel in order to analyze the effect of different governmental policies on recycling channels of end-0f-life vehicles. Based on the model, three conditions are taken into account. （1） the government does not adopt any policy （2） the government takes the subsidy policy to formal recyclers （3） the government takes the monitoring control policy to informal recyclers. We compare the impacts of government subsidies and effort of government monitoring control on the unit recycling price, recycling product quality, profit and environment in the above three scenarios. The results show that. （1） the formal recyclers and informal recyclers will improve the unit recycling price when government takes subsidy poliey the formal recycler reduces the unit recycling price and informal recycler improves the unit recycling price when government takes the monitoring control policy （2） the effects of governmental different policies on the unit recycling price, recycling product quality, profit and environment are related to the amount of government subsidies, effort of government monitoring control, the coefficient of unit recycling price of formal recyclers and the coefficient of effort of government regulation.