动态惩罚机制下互联网金融平台行为及监管策略的演化博弈分析

Analysis on the behavior of internet finance platform and regulation strategy under dynamic punishment mechanism based on evolutionary game theory

运用演化博弈理论研究了互联网金融平台行为及监管策略的博弈演化过程,系统考察了互联网金融平台行为及监管博弈过程的影响因素,并重点对固定惩罚机制和动态惩罚机制下互联网金融平台行为及其监管策略博弈均衡进行了比较.研究表明,固定惩罚机制下,互联网金融平台和金融监管机构的博弈过程不能达到稳定的均衡状态,两个群体的行为呈现周期模式.动态惩罚机制下,互联网金融平台和金融监管机构间的博弈演化轨迹呈螺旋收敛的趋势;互联网金融平台的"自律"的初始概率不同,其随时间演化收敛到不同的均衡值;提高最重惩罚度上限,互联网金融平台选择"自律"行为策略的概率增加.

The evolutionary process of the behavior of internet finance platform and regulation strategy is discussed from the perspective of evolutionary game theory. Also the influencing factor of the evolutionary process is analyzed systematically. And evolutionary equilibriums of the behavior of internet finance plat- form and regulation strategy are compared under fixed punishment mechanism and dynamic punishment mechanism. The findings are the evolutionary process of the behavior of internet finance platform and regulation strategy can＇t reach equilibrium state and the behavior of the two groups presents cycle mode under fixed punishment mechanism. In contrast, the evolutionary process of the behavior of internet fi- nance platform and regulation strategy presents spiral convergence under dynamic punishment mechanism. If the initial probability of self-discipline behavior of internet financial platform is different, the value of evolutionary equilibrium convergence is different. The probability of self-discipline behavior of internet financial platform will increase improving punishment degree limit.