多方博弈下起重作业人员有意不安全行为致因分析

Causation analysis on intentional unsafe behavior of crane operator under multi-parties game

为有效制定起重作业人员有意不安全行为防范措施,降低人为事故发生可能性,结合演化博弈理论,探讨不同策略选择下施工企业内部管理方、监管方及作业方的得益变化,建立各方期望效益函数;依据复制动态方程,构建多方演化博弈模型,分析各方策略选择演化趋势及均衡点,剖析作业人员有意不安全行为致因,并分别从各方角度制定作业人员有意不安全行为预防措施。结果表明:作业人员有意不安全行为不仅与自身风险、成本有关,且受管理方、监管方决策影响;管理方增加安全投入,提升作业人员事故损失承担比例;监管方选择合理监管方式严格监管作业行为;作业人员进行行为决策时权衡风险、成本、收益及各方决策,将有效减少作业人员有意不安全行为的发生。

To formulate the effective precautionary measures for intentional unsafe behavior of the crane operator and reduce the possibility of human accidents, the benefit change of manager party, regulator party and operator party in the construction enterprise under different strategies choices was discussed combining with the evolutionary game theory, then the expected benefit functions of all parties were established. A model of multi-parties evolutionary game was constructed according to the replicator dynamics equations. The evolutionary trend and equilibrium point of strategy choice for all parties were analyzed, and the causations of intentional unsafe behavior of operator were discussed, then the prevention measures for intentional un- safe behavior of the operator were formulated from the perspective of each party respectively. The results showed that the in- tentional unsafe behavior of the operator is not only related to their own risk and cost, but also affected by the decision-mak- ing of manager party and regulator party. The occurrence of intentional unsafe behavior of the operator will be effectively re- duced if that the manager party increases the safety input and improve the operator＇s bearing proportion of accident losses, that the regulator party chooses a reasonable regulation way to regulate the operation behavior strictly, and that the operator weighs the risk, cost, benefit and decision of the other parties when conducting the behavior decision-making. It provides a certain reference for the formulation of prevention measures for safety accidents of lifting operation.