大股东代理问题与上市公司的盈余持续性

Controlling Shareholders' Agency Problem and Earnings Persistence

利用2007-2012年企业集团财务公司与其关联上市公司之间签订的《金融服务协议》,本文构建大股东过度占款作为大股东代理问题严重的指标,考察大股东代理问题对上市公司盈余持续性的影响。研究发现,大股东代理问题越严重,上市公司的盈余持续性越差,上述关系在国有上市公司、成长性好的上市公司中更加明显。进一步研究发现,机构投资者能够有效监督大股东,缓解代理问题带来的效率损失,发挥积极的治理作用。

Based on financial services agreements between financial companies and related listed companies from 2007 to 2012,we construct controlling shareholder' s fund over-occupancy as the measure of serious agency problem,and examine the effects of controlling shareholder' s agency problem on earnings persistence. We find that the more serious the agency problem,the worse the earnings persistence is. the above relation is more obvious in state-owned listed companies and higher growth listed companies. Further results show that institutional investors can supervise the controlling shareholder effectively,reduce the efficiency loss caused by controlling shareholder' s agency problem,and play a positive role in corporate governance.