基于非对称演化博弈的京冀雾霾协同治理联盟稳定性分析

Asymmetrical Evolutionary Game Model of Haze Governance Alliance in Beijing and Hebei Province

当前,雾霾已成为制约首都经济、社会发展的首要环境问题。本文基于生态补偿及生态索赔的视角,构建了京冀雾霾治理联盟的非对称演化博弈模型,分析了京冀雾霾治理联盟的稳定性,并得到最优策略组合。研究结果表明:在不实行行政干预的情况下,由于成本因素及当地政府生态索赔措施的疲软,企业不会自主选择节能减排策略。合理的生态补偿标准对于企业采取节能减排策略至关重要。当两地生态索赔的总值低于企业节能减排的成本时,无益于企业采取节能减排策略,且生态补偿的额度过高会使得企业宁愿索赔不治污。只有两地生态索赔的总值高于企业节能减排成本,企业才会采取节能减排策略,并且实施节能减排策略不会被生态补偿的额度撼动。

Currently, haze has become the primary environmental problem restricting the development of economy and society in Beijing. Based on the perspective of ecological compensation and ecological claim, this paper constructs the asymmetrical evolutionary game model of haze governance alliance in Beijing and Hebei province, analyzes the stability of this alliance and finally gets the optimal strategy combination. The resuhs show that without the administrative intervention, enterprises will not choose energy conservation and emission reduction for the cost and weak ecological claim of local government. Reasonable ecological claim standard is crucial for enterprises taking energy conservation and emission reduction strategy. If the total value of ecological claim in these two cities is lower than the cost of energy conservation and emission reduction, enterprises will not prefer energy con- servation and emission reduction, and they will prefer claim rather than govern pollution when ecological claim is too high. Only when the total value of ecological claim in these two cities is higher than the cost of energy conser- vation and emission reduction, will they choose energy conservation and emission reduction strategy, and this strategy will not be affected by the amount of ecological claim.