审计质量、社会信任和并购支付方式

Audit Quality,Social Trust and Payment Methods in M&As

信息不对称存在于并购交易的每个环节,对并购流程中的相关决策具有重要影响。将信息不对称降低制度与并购支付方式决策的关系作为主要研究目标,以并购交易审计师特征和区域信任环境为切入点,基于2007~2015年沪深A股上市公司发生的713例并购交易事件,运用Ordered probit模型考察审计质量、社会信任对并购支付方式选择的影响机制。研究发现,目标公司的审计质量越高,或者主并方所处区域的社会信任度越高,现金支付的概率越高;高社会信任度的环境下,目标公司的审计质量与主并方选择现金支付的概率正相关,表明社会信任对注册会计师审计的信息不对称降低功能具有促进效应。研究丰富了并购对价系列文献,在信息不对称降低框架中纳入信任因素,为审计契约的作用机制研究提供我国上市公司并购领域的经验证据。

There is considerable information asymmetry in the mergers and acquisitions, which influences the decision-making of M＆As. In this paper,we empirically examine the relationship between the systems that reduce information asymmetry and the methods of payment, from the perspective of M＆As audit and local social trust environment. Using multivariate ordered probit model, based on a sample of M＆As by China＇ s A-share listed companies over the period 2007-2015 ,the empirical results show that acquirers are more likely to accept a fixed payments if targets＇ financial statements are certified by higher quality audits or social trust of acquirers is higher. Furthermore, the finding shows that higher audit quality has a promoting effect on the choice of fixed method of payment when acquiring firm is in a higher social trust environment. The study can enrich the literature on M＆A prices, and it provides evidence of the effect and mechanism of audit contract for the M＆A by China＇ s listed companies.