精准扶贫背景下驻村机制的实践困境及其后果——以豫中J县驻村“第一书记”扶贫为例?

On the Practical Plight of the Residency Support System and Its Consequences in the Context of Precise Poverty Alleviation:A Case Study of the “First Secretary” Poverty Alleviation at J County in Henan Province

从豫中J县"第一书记"扶贫制度的调查资料分析中可知,"第一书记"与上级政府、派出单位、乡镇干部和村干部多元主体之间存在互动关系,当下驻村机制呈现出复杂的社会性、结构性因素。研究发现,"第一书记"扶贫工作的开展一方面受到了上级政府目标设置权责不匹配与原单位有限资源的条件限制;另一方面遭遇了乡镇干部与村干部之间的"共谋"与"乡-村"关系的闭合。这样双重排斥的结构性变化不仅影响了"第一书记"扶贫工作的本身,还导致了驻村帮扶制度的变迁,使得国家对于农村基层社会的控制能力弱化。因此,必须采取增加驻村干部权力、加大资源支持以及打破乡镇干部与村干部之间的"共谋"与"垄断"等措施。

From the analysis of the survey data of the ＂ first secretary＂ poverty alleviation system at J County in Henan province, it can be seen that there is a interactive relationship between the ＂first secretary＂ and such multiple subjects as the superior government, the supporting unit, the township leaders, and the village leaders; the current residency system is involved with complicated social and structural factors. The findings of the study indicate that on the one hand the first secretary＇s work is restricted by the conditions that his responsibilities do not match the target set by the superior government and the resources of his supporting unit are limited; on the other hand his work is challenged by a ＂conspiracy＂ between the township leaders and the village leaders and the close-up of the township-village relations. Such dual exclusive structural changes not only affect the first secretary＇s poverty alleviation work itself, but also results in the changes of the support system, thus the control ability of the state on the rural grassroots society is weakened. Therefore, relevant measures should be taken to strengthen the power of the leaders stay at the villages, increase the resource support, and break the ＂conspiracy＂ and ＂monopoly＂ between the township leaders and the village leaders.