业绩预期压力、高管股权激励与企业投资不足

The Pressure of Performance Expectations, Executive Equity Incentive and Investment Shortage of Firms

本文以2007~2015年中国A股上市公司为研究样本,基于资本市场的业绩预期压力对企业投资不足的影响,探讨高管股权激励对该影响的治理效应,以及发挥治理作用的具体股权激励类型。研究发现:(1)业绩预期压力的增大会加剧企业投资不足;(2)高管股权激励能够缓解业绩预期压力带来的投资不足;(3)相对于限制性股票和激励型股权激励,股票期权与福利型股权激励对业绩预期压力引起投资不足的缓解作用更强。

Based on the samples of A-share listed firms in China during 2007-2015 and the impacts of the pressure of performance expectation from capital market on the investment shortage of firms, the authors of this paper analyze the governance effects of executive equity incentive on the impacts, and the type of equity incentive that plays a role in gov- ernance. It＇ s found that, （1） the increase in the pressure of performance expectation will intensify the investment shortage of firms; （2） the executive equity incentive will reduce the shortage; （3） compared to the incentives of restricted stocks and incentive-type equity, the stock options and welfare-equity incentives are more likely to reduce the shortage.