摘要
针对研发外包服务商参与客户技术成果转化中的道德风险防范与激励问题,首先分析合作奖励机制与非合作监督机制(包括确定性和随机性监督)的成立条件,随后比较合作奖励、确定性监督、随机监督3种机制对服务商道德风险的防范激励效果。研究表明:成果转化成功的概率和监督成本是影响3种机制选择的关键因素。最后根据成果转化成功概率和监督成本,给出3种服务商道德风险防范激励机制的选择条件,并通过算例对结论进行验证。
For the moral hazard prevention and incentive problems of service providers in the achievement transformation of R＆D outsourcing, the establishment condition of cooperation reward mechanism and non- cooperation monitoring mechanism, which includes determinate monitoring and stochastic monitoring, are analyzed firstly. Then the paper compares respectively the effects of cooperation reward, determinate monitoring and stochastic monitoring on the moral hazard prevention and incentive problems of service providers. The result shows, the success probabihty of achievement transformation and the monitoring cost are the key factors influencing the choice of three mechanisms. Finally, with the success probability and monitoring cost, the applicable conditions of three mechanisms are provided. In addition, these results are verified by an example.
作者
宋寒
刘玉清
代应
SONG Han LIU Yuqing DAI Ying(College of Management, Chongqing University of Technology, Chongqing 400054, Chin)
出处
《科技管理研究》
CSSCI
北大核心
2017年第11期240-249,共10页
Science and Technology Management Research
基金
国家自然科学基金项目"知识密集型服务外包中的知识共享激励与知识资产争端协调机制"(71301182)
"新一代信息技术产业‘联盟组合’与创新能力研究:涌现
构型与治理"(71572028)
重庆市科委决策咨询与管理创新计划项目"重庆市汽车产业可持续发展动力机制与对策研究"(cstc2014jccxB60001)
重庆市重大决策咨询研究课题"基于大数据视角的重庆物流成本控制研究"(2016ZB-02)
重庆理工大学研究生创新基金项目"面向客户与服务商知识共享的研发外包合同设计及应用研究"(YCX2015242)
关键词
研发外包
技术成果转化
道德风险
奖励
监督
R＆D outsourcing
achievement transformation
moral hazard
reward
monitoring
