重大工程供应链协同合作利益分配研究

Study on Profit Distribution of Collaboration in Mega Project Supply Chain

本文以重大工程中承包商与供应商协同合作问题为研究对象,考虑到决策主体的决策环境、决策顺序和决策目的的不同,从分散决策模式、集中决策模式两种模式分别建立相应的协同合作动态博弈模型,模型构建考虑到承包商与供应商的异质性,从而突出两者对协同合作贡献的不同权重,并分析给出不同模式下的最优利益分配机制、最优努力程度和供应链系统最优收益,最后进行比较分析与数值模拟。研究结果表明:当承包商和供应商的努力都对产出有影响时,不管哪种决策模式,承包商与供应商的协同合作必须要分享收益才可以激发合作积极性,而收益分配系数只与双方的产出贡献权重有关;存在双边道德风险时,承包商在分散决策模式下的收益高于集中决策模式,因而承包商倾向于选择分散决策模式,而供应商则相反,但承包商与供应商选择集中决策模式对供应链系统整体收益最优。

The collaboration of contractor and supplier in mega project has a significant help for the production schedule enhancement and quality improvement of key equipment and prefabrication resources. There-fore, the owner often takes a variety of incentives to encourage the collaboration between contractor and supplier such as the establishment of prizes, which the distribution mechanism of benefit will influence the collaboration performance. In order to promote the collaboration and enhance the performance, the collaboration of contractor and supplier in mega project is taken as the object of the research. Based on the differences of decision environment, decision order and decision purpose, two dynamic game models which are decentralized decision making model and centralized decision making model are designed. Given the differ ence between contractor and supplier, the model highlights the weight of contribution. Then the best profit distribution mechanism, the best effort and the best benefit are given. Also comparative analysis and numerical modeling are taken. The research shows that when contractor＇s effort and supplier＇s effort all have the impact on the output, the profit must be shared which can incent the enthusiasm of collaboration. The distribution coefficient is only affected by the weight of output contribution. The contractor＇s distri- bution coefficient is positively correlated to his own weight of output contribution, while is negatively correlated to the supplier;s weight of output contribution. The best effort and best revenue are negatively correlated to the cost coefficient of either side. When the bilateral moral hazard exists, the contractor＇s benefit in decentralized decision making model is higher than its in centralized decision making model, so contractor prefer to choose decentralized model, while the supplier is inverse. It is also indicated that the benefit of the supply chain system is optimal in centralized decision making model. The research will have a great help for decision making and strategy selection of contractor and supplier in their collaboration.