摘要
本文以2008年省高院院长(法官)异地交流作为地方司法独立性提升的自然实验,检验了法官异地交流对上市公司违规的执法力度及执法可置信程度的影响。实证发现:(1)司法独立性提升不仅增加了公司违规被查处的概率,同样也加大了公司违规公告的市场负面反应。(2)相比民营企业,这一作用更多体现在国有企业中。(3)相比制度环境较差的地区,这一作用在制度环境较好的地区更明显。(4)司法独立性提升的效果不仅体现在执法力度及执法可置信程度上,其震慑作用还减少了公司"掏空型"关联交易行为。本文的研究表明司法独立性提升通过对监管部门、投资者和公司三方面的影响加强了投资者保护,其结论拓展和丰富了世界范围内司法独立性经济后果的相关研究。
The geographical rotation of chief justices of Higher People' s Court in 2008 as a natural experiment of judicial independence promote, this paper investigates the net effect of judicial independence on strength and the credibility of law enforcement in listed companies of China. We found that : ( 1 ) the judicial independence not only significantly increases the probability of identifying and prosecuting securities unlawful actions of companies, but also enhances the negative market reaction to companies when the violations are disclosed, (2) compared with private enterprises, these effects are more significant in state -controlled firms which are protected by local judicature ; and ( 3 ) the effects are more significant in companies listed in a better legal environment than companies listed in a poor legal environment. ( 4 ) The effect of independence of judicial is reflected in strength and the credibility of law enforcement, and its deterrent effect reduces the firm~ tunneling related party transactions. Finally, this paper shows that judicial independence promote the protection of investors by influencing regulators, investors and companies, enriching and developing the literature about economic consequences of judicial independence around the world.
出处
《金融研究》
CSSCI
北大核心
2017年第5期191-206,共16页
Journal of Financial Research
基金
国家自然科学基金面上项目(批准号:71672151)
教育部人文社会科学研究西部和边疆地区青年基金项目(批准号:13XJC630001)的资助
关键词
司法独立性
法官异地交流
公司违规
Judicial Independence, Rotation of Judge, Violations of Companies