内部人协议、失业呆滞与货币政策

Insider Agreement,Unemployment Hysteresis and Monetary Policy

基于内部人协议的角度,在NK-DSGE模型中引入失业呆滞,并分析其宏观经济效应,研究发现,失业呆滞导致逆向外生冲击对于宏观经济产生"永久性伤害"。在此基础上,进一步剖析失业呆滞背景下的货币政策机制设计问题,结果表明,在失业呆滞显著存在的背景下,基于政策的稳定效应和社会福利考虑,中央银行仍应该使用Evans规则以稳定劳动力市场,并且赋予失业相对较大的权重。因此,科学剖析失业呆滞的成因,进而清除导致失业呆滞形成的诱导因素,对于缓解失业和Evans规则的有效实施均具有重要的意义。

Based on the insider agreement perspective,this paper studies a NK-DSGE model w ith unemployment hysteresis and investigates its effects on macroeconomics. The result show s that negative exogenous shocks lead to permanent harms to the economy,on w hich monetary policy design is analyzed. When there is unemployment hysteresis in labor market,central bank still can resort Evans rule to stabilize the labor market and a relative bigger w eight should be endow ed to unemployment,since this rule w orks better to stabilize the labor market and improves social w elfare relatively. Therefore,it＇s of great significance to alleviate unemployment and implement of Evans rule by investigating the reasons of unemployment hysteresis and clearing aw ay the causes of unemployment hysteresis.