摘要
本文利用2010-2014年中国沪深A股的并购样本数据,引入媒体监督这一社会治理变量,来研究媒体监督对并购后高管薪酬变化的影响。研究表明:并购行为发生之后高管薪酬会出现一个明显的增长;媒体监督由于其外部性,能够对并购后高管薪酬的上升起到负向的调节作用。
This paper based on the sample data of listed companies of A share listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchange between 2010 and 2014,a total of 10489 samples were collected from 2354 companies.and the empirical analysis was conducted.The research results show that:executive compensation will have a significant growth after the M&A;media supervision,due to its external,can plays a negative regulatory role on the rise of executive pay after the M&A.
出处
《财会通讯（下）》
北大核心
2017年第6期108-112,共5页
Communication of Finance and Accounting
关键词
并购
高管薪酬
媒体监督
M&A
Media supervision
Executive compensation
