论黑格尔哲学体系的开端问题

On the Problem of the Beginning in Hegel's Philosophical System

黑格尔哲学体系的开端难题,应从绝对者的本性来理解。绝对者作为思维所内含的自身与自身的"原始分裂",标志着其本质结构,是其得以开始运动的内在动力,是其整个辩证运动的"灵魂"。这种"原始分裂",就其首先显现为一种自身与自身的对立关系而言,即是外在反思所代表的那种"两分的观点"。抽象的反思或知性,构成了绝对者最初显现。因而,从反思开始的必然性,正是由绝对者的本性所决定的。但与开端相关的且直接影响到黑格尔整个体系方案成立与否的一个问题在于:将哲学家的思维运动内化为对象自己的思维运动,从而使两者合一,并不能解决理念运动的发生学问题。

The puzzle concerning the beginning in Hegel’s philosophical system should be understood in terms of the nature of the absolute.The'original dissociation'of the self from the self contained in the absolute as thought,designating its essential structure,is the immanent motive power for its first movements and the'soul'of its entire dialectic movement.Insofar as the original division is first of all manifested as the oppositional relationship between the self and itself,it is nothing but'the viewpoint of dichotomy'represented in external reflection.Abstract reflection or understanding constitutes the first manifestation of the absolute.Therefore,the necessity of starting from reflection is determined simply by the nature of the absolute.However,there is a problem that relates to the beginning and that directly affects whether the Hegelian system as a whole is tenable or not:internalizing philosophers’movement of thought into the objects’own movement of thought,so that these two thoughts are unified into one,would do nothing to solve the question of how the movement of ideas begins.