创新联盟双元独占的治理研究

Study on the Governance of Ambidextrous Appropriability in Innovation Alliance

双元独占是研究企业如何既能从现有创新中获利又能从现有创新催生的未来创新中获利的问题,然而,现有文献在联盟层面平衡双元独占冲突问题的治理机制及作用效应方面的研究相对缺乏。从资源基础视角入手,通过对高技术产业207份有效问卷调查,研究不同治理机制对联盟企业的双元独占的作用差异,并考虑联盟类型的调节作用。结果表明,正式治理机制有利于提升联盟企业的原发性独占和生成性独占;非正式治理机制会降低联盟企业的原发性独占,但会提升联盟企业的生成性独占;与规模联盟相比,范围联盟会加强正式治理机制与原发性独占、生成性独占以及非正式治理机制与生成性独占间的正向关系,但它对非正式治理机制与原发性独占间关系的调节作用不显著。

Ambidextrous appropriability study is how to profit both from the existing innovation and also from the future innovation spawned the existing one, however, it is lack of research on the governance mechanism and its effect of balancing ambidextrous conflict problems in the existing literature. On a resource- based view, through the 207 valid questionnaires of high- tech industry, we distinguish the different effects of different governance mechanisms on ambidextrous appropriability of alliance enterprises, and consider the moderating effect of alliance type. As a result, formal govemance mechanism is conducive to enhance both primary appropriability and genera- tive appropriability of alliance enterprises; informal govemance mechanism can reduce the primary appropriability of alliance enterprises, but enhance the generative appropriability of alliance enterprises; compared with scale allia- nce, link alliance can strengthen the positive relationship between formal govemance mechanism, primary appropria- bility and generative appropriability, and the same between infermal govemance mechanism and generative appropri- ability, but its moderating effect on the relationship between informal governance mechamsm and primary appropri- abitity is unsigmficant.