控制权获取、CEO变更与合谋掏空——基于上市公司并购事件的研究

Obtaining Control, CEO Replacement, Collusion and Tunneling

通过并购获取公司的控制权、随后变更CEO并与之合谋是大股东掏空行为得逞的重要途径。利用2007~2015年中国上市公司数据进行实证检验,得到的结论有:公司控制权转移一般同时会引起CEO变更,但控制权转移并不必然导致掏空;如果并购方以劣质企业为并购目标,并且实施的是跨行业并购,掏空是大股东获取控制权的主要动机。进一步,若控制权转移的同时发生CEO变更,其目的是实施掏空动机下大股东与高管的合谋行为。为此,本文建议针对那些动机难以合理解释的并购行为,提前识别掏空与合谋行为,并加强监管。

An important approach for tunneling by major shareholder is to first obtain control of the company through mergers and acquisitions, and then to replace CEO and collude with the new CEO. Empirically investigates data of Chinese listed companies from 2007 to 2015, the paper finds that the change of corporate control in general leads to the replacement of CEO, but not necessarily leads to tunneling. However, conglomerate M＆As across different industries that target at enterprises with inferior performances often have tunneling as the main motive. Moreover, if the CEO is replaced simultaneously with the change of control, it often aims at collusion between major shareholder and CEO. Therefore, the regulators should pay attention to M＆As with unexplainable motivations, to identify tunneling and collusion in advance, and to strengthen regulation accordingly.