财政补贴是否有利于引导光伏企业扩大研发投入?——基于上市公司数据的动态博弈分析

Is Subsidies Conducive to Guide PV Enterprises to expand R&D investment?——Dynamic Game Analysis Based on Datum of Listed Companies

加大光伏技术研发投入是当前降低光伏产品生产成本、提升光伏产业竞争力的关键。为引导企业加大光伏研发投资,各级政府在人才引进、研发设备购置、创新平台建设等方面制定了大量优惠政策,但企业是否在财政补贴的引导下扩大企业研发投入成为一个值得关注的问题。在前人分析思路的基础上,建立了财政补贴有效性的动态博弈模型,对光伏企业研发投入的影响因素进行了分析,选取沪深股市上市公司的面板数据进行了实证分析。实证分析发现,光伏产业的补贴有一定的效果,财政补贴、沉淀成本、科研人员数量以及上市年限等因素都会对企业研发行为产生影响。

R＆D investment increase is the key to reducing production costs and enhancing the competitive- ness in PV industry. To guide enterprises to increase R＆D investment in PV industry, governments of all levels have introduced a large number of preferential policies in the talent introduction, research equip- ment, innovation platform construction and other aspects, but it is a matter of concern whether the enterprises will expand R＆D with the financial subsidies of governments. Based on previous studies, this paper established a dynamic game model about the effectiveness of financial subsidies,analyzed the influence factors of R＆D investment in PV enterprises, and analyzed empirically the panel data from the Listed Com- panies in Shanghai and Shenzhen stock markets. The empirical analysis shows that the subsidy of governments in PV industry achieved certain effect, and such factors as financial subsidies, sunk costs, the num- ber of researchers and the number of listed companies will play an important role in the R＆D of enterprises.