国有企业混合所有制改革的方式选择——基于社会福利最大化视角

Choices of Mixed Ownership Reform of State-owned Enterprises——Based on the Perspective of Social Welfare Maximization

基于社会福利最大化视角,着重讨论国有企业混合所有制改革的方式选择。研究发现:(1)在古诺产量竞争或者斯塔克伯格领导者-跟随者产量竞争情形下,管理层持股(MBO)比员工持股(ESOP)更能提高社会福利水平;当并购效率较高时,国有企业采用并购民营企业的方式实现混合所有制相比MBO和ESOP这两种方式更有利于社会福利水平的提高;(2)在伯川德价格竞争情形下,当混合所有制企业中国有股占比界于0~0.6,或者界于0.68~1时,采取MBO方式比ESOP更有利于社会福利的提高;当国有股占比界于0.6~0.68时,则应该鼓励以ESOP的方式实现混合所有制经营;但是,不管国有股占比和并购效率如何,采用并购民营企业的方式是最优的。

Based on the perspective of social welfare maximization, this paper focuses on the choices of mixed ownership reform of state-owned enterprises. The results show that ： （ 1 ） under the Cournot competition or the Stack- elberg leader-follower competition, the choice of management buy-out（MBO） can improve more social welfare than employee stock ownership （ESOP） ;when the merger efficiency is high enough, to merge with a private firm is more conducive to the improvement of social welfare compared with the MBO and the ESOP ; （2） under the Bertrand com- petition, when the state-owned shares accounted for 0 - 0.6 or 0.68 - 1, the choice of the MBO is conducive to improving social welfare than the ESOP; while when the state-owned shares is between 0.6 - 0.68, it should be encouraged for the form of the ESOP; how ever the state-owned shares and merger efficiency would be, to merge with a private firm is optimal compared to the MBO and the ESOP.