管理者过度自信与企业非效率投资

Managers Overconfidence and Inefficient Investment in Enterprises

在不考虑信息不对称和代理问题的"非理性管理者"模型框架下,选取中国上市企业近五年(2008—2012年)的样本,研究了不同企业属性下的管理者过度自信对企业投资决策和投资效率的差异性影响。结果表明,企业自由现金流充裕时,管理者过度自信与企业过度投资正相关。在过度投资方面,管理者过度自信对民营企业的影响更大;在投资不足方面,国有企业对自由现金流过高的依赖使得管理者过度自信对国有企业的影响更大。

Regardless of the information asymmetry and under the framework of ＂non rational managers＂ of agency problems,the paper selects samples of the Chinese listed companies in recent five years（from 2008 to 2012）, and analyses the difference whether managers overconfidence affects on the enterprises investment and investment efficiency between different enterprises properties. The result indicates that when the free cash flow is sufficient, the managers′ overconfidence is positively related to the over investment in enterprises. In the case of over investment,effect of the managers′ overconfidence on private enterprises is bigger;in the case of under investment,high reliance on free cash flow makes the impact of the managers′ overconfidence on the of the state-owned enterprises is greater.