政府扶持中小企业科技创新的动态演化博弈及仿真分析

The Evolutionary Game Simulation on Technology Innovation between Government and Small and Medium-sized Enterprises

运用演化博弈理论,在有限理性的假设前提下,借助科技创新利益主体非对称性演化博弈分析的复制动态模型,对政府与中小企业之间的科技创新行为进行博弈分析,重点探讨利益相关主体间的行为及相互影响的动态演变过程,讨论演化参数结果的稳定性及如何形成稳定均衡策略,最后运用Matlab软件仿真演化过程。研究结果表明,在利益双方科技创新意识越强、科技创新成本越小、利益双方获取的收益越大的条件下,系统更容易收敛于理想状态;政府对中小企业科技创新行为的激励力度应当合理控制,激励力度过大容易使中小企业受经济利益驱使,最终使利益双方陷入一种不良"锁定"状态。

Using evolution game theory, based on the assumed premise of limited rational, the paper relies on the copy dynamic model of evolution game analysis in non-symmetric interests subject in science and technology innovation. The paper carries out the game analysis on technology innovation behavior between government and small and medium-sized enterprises, focuses on the dynamic evolution process of the behavior and mutual effects of related subjects, and analyzes the stability of evolution parameter results and the stable balanced strategy. Last the paper uses Matlab software to simulate the evolution process. Research results show that when the interests-related both sides have stronger consciousness of scientific and technological innovation with lower cost of technological innovation and greater benefits of both sides, it is much easier for the system to converge to the ideal state; government should reasonably control the incentives for small and medium-sized enterprises technology innovation, because over incentives may cause the problem that small and medium enterprises are driven by economic interests, leading to a malign ＂locked＂ state.