服务商垫资风险规避下的研发外包合同

R & D Outsourcing for Service Providers with Risk Averse of Restrict Capital

在服务商是风险规避的情况下,针对服务商不愿垫资可能引发激励支付无效的问题,利用委托代理理论,构建风险规避下服务商不愿垫资的研发外包合同,分析服务商绝对风险规避度对研发外包合同的影响,得到了服务商不愿垫资下的研发外包合同性质与特点。研究表明,当服务商的绝对风险规避度较小时,客户企业支付给服务商的固定研发费用以及收入共享比例不变,服务商选择的最优努力水平不变,激励支付无效;当服务商的绝对风险规避度较大时,客户企业支付给服务商的固定支付先增加后减小,收入共享比例系数以及服务商选择的最优支付不断减小,服务商风险规避度越大,激励支付越无效。

Service providers are unwilling to restrict capital, which may lead to the ineffectiveness of incentive payment. Aiming at this problem, under the condition of risk aversion, this paper used the principal-agent theory to construct an R ＆ D outsourcing contract for the circumstances that service providers are unwilling to restrict capital with risk averse, and analyzed the influence of absolute risk aversion of service providers on R ＆ D outsourcing contract. Then this paper found the nature and characteristics of this R ＆ D outsourcing. Research shows that when the service provider＇s absolute risk aversion is relatively small, the fixed expenses paid to service providers by customer companies and revenue sharing ratio remain unchanged, and optimal effort level that service providers select is still unchanged, but the incentive payment is invalid; when the service provider＇ s absolute risk aversion is relatively large, the fixed expenses paid to service providers by customer companies increase first and then decrease, and revenue sharing ratio and optimal effort level that service providers select are dechning. What＇ s more, the greater the risk aversion of service providers is, the less effective incentive payments are.