混合所有制陷阱真的存在吗——来自我国民营类上市公司跨所有制并购的微观证据

Does the Mixed Ownership Trap Really Exist?——Micro Evidence of Transownership Mergers and Acquisitions of PrivatelyOperated Companies in China

虽然混合所有制从理论上能提高产权效率,但我国混合所有制改革却困难重重,究其原因可能在于民营企业在改革过程中所面临的"陷阱说"。本文以民营企业参与混合所有制改革为背景,实证检验其跨所有制并购的经济绩效。结果发现:民营企业参与混合所有制改革并不意味着制度或交易陷阱的普遍存在,跨所有制并购能有效提升并购后的组织绩效,这种绩效提升与民营资本能否取得控制权无关;进一步分析还发现,如相较于属地和多元化并购,异地和专业化的跨所有制并购效果更好,由此证明相较于治理层面隐性的控制权归属,经营层面的地域选择与行业协同才是其业绩实现的必备条件。研究结论既有效破除了"混改陷阱说",也为民营企业积极参与混合所有制改革提供了可行的路径选择。

Although the mixed ownership is the most efficient property rights arrangements in theory, but China＇s mixed ownership reform is difficult, the reason may lie in the private capital involved in the process of ＂trap＂. In this paper, private enterprises involved in mixed change is treated as the background, through the empirical test of cross ownership mergers and the economic consequences of the results,the paper found： private enterprises involved in mixed change does not mean that the transaction trap exist commonly, transownership mergers cannot bring signifi- cant positive market reaction, but they can effectively improve post merger organizational performance.The perfor- mance improvement has no relationship with the controlment of private capital; furthermore, as compared to the terri- torial and diversified merger, transownership mergers shows better off-site and specialization, it proves that compared to the governance level implicit control of the ownership, region selection and industry management level is the essen- tial condition of the cooperative performance. This is not only effective to get rid of the theory of mixed change trap, but also provides a viable path choice for private enterprises to actively participate in the mixed ownership reform.