摘要
针对研发外包中服务商道德风险防范与激励问题,在考虑服务商风险规避度和垫资能力的情况下,设计了收益共享研发外包合同,分析了服务商风险规避度和垫资能力对固定支付、收益共享系数以及服务商最优研发投入的影响.研究表明,当风险规避度大于阀值时,客户在研发合同设计时不用考虑服务商垫资能力问题,因为服务商不会接受垫资;当风险规避度小于阀值时,研发合同设计中需要进一步考虑服务商垫资能力,特别是当服务商风险规避度特别小的时候,针对不同垫资能力的服务商,随着服务商垫资能力的增加,客户最优的研发外包固定支付先减少,后达到稳定不变,但客户最优的研发外包收益共享系数却是先不变,后增加,最后达到稳定不变.
To solve the problems of service providers＇ moral hazard and incentive problems , it designed revenue sharing R＆D outsoureing contract considering the service providers＇ risk aversion and fund capacity, and analyzed the influence of the risk aversion and fund capacity on fixed payment, revenue sharing ratio and optimal R＆D investment. Research shows that when risk aversion is greater than the threshold, customer companies do not consider the problem of service providers＇ fund capacity in the R＆D contract design. When risk aversion degree is less than the threshold, service providers＇ fund capacity needs further consideration in the design of the contract. Especially, when service providers＇ risk aversion degree is particularly low, with the increase of service providers＇ fund capacity, the fixed payment keep constant after the first reducing, and the revenue sharing ratio is firstly unchanged, then increasing, and finally unchanged.
作者
宋寒
邵云飞
毛慧颖
代应
SONG Han SHAO Yun-fei Mao Hui-ying DAI Ying(School of Management and Economics, University of Electronic Science and Technology, Chengdu 611731, China School of Management, Chongqing University of Technology, Chengdu 400054, China)
出处
《研究与发展管理》
CSSCI
北大核心
2017年第3期44-52,共9页
R&D Management
基金
国家自然科学基金资助项目"知识密集型服务外包中的知识共享激励与知识资产争端协调机制研究"(71301182)
"新一代信息技术产业‘联盟组合’与创新能力研究:涌现
构型与治理"(71572028)
关键词
研发外包
风险规避
垫资能力
收益共享
R＆D outsourcing
risk aversion
fund capacity
revenue sharing
