基于公平偏好与学习效应的委托代理契约设计

The principal-agent contract design based on fairness preference and learning effect

基于公平偏好和学习效应理论,通过改进传统经济学中纯粹自利人假设下的HM委托代理模型,研究了委托代理框架下存在公平偏好及学习效应的最优契约设计.结果表明:公平偏好能够激励代理人付出更多的努力和学习,而学习效应可以有效提高委托人的期望收益.当代理人具有较高的公平偏好和风险贴现因子时,最优激励契约应增加代理人固定收益比重,降低风险性的收益分享比重;雇佣具有较高初始能力的员工、激励员工加强学习均可提高委托人期望收益;雇佣具有较高公平偏好程度和较低风险规避程度的员工可以有效降低代理成本.该结论为降低代理成本,实施有效的委托激励提供了新的思路.

Based on fairness preference theory and learning effect theory of modern economics, in this paper, we have improved the HM principal-agent model under pure self-interest assumption of traditional economics, and have studied the optimal contract design with fairness preference and learning effect under principal agent framework. The results show that the fairness preference can motivate the agents to pay more effort and learning, and the learning effect can effectively improve the client＇s expected income. When the agents have higher fairness preference and higher risk discount factor, the optimal incentive contract will be a higher proportion of fixed income and a lower proportion of risk premium; employing the employees with higher initial capacity and motivating them to reinforce learning can improve the client＇s expected revenue; employing the employees with higher fairness preference and lower risk aversion can reduce the agency costs effectively. This conclusion provides us a new way to reduce the agency cost and to implement the effective incentive.