知道即为正确

Knowing as Simply Being Correct

所有那些知识论上最牢固确立的论题之一是:知识不单纯是一种真信念。如此这般被标准描述的知识,至少是一个知识论上得到确证的真信念,也许是通过作为好证据的确证。但是这个标准的概念在知识论上比其应当所是得到更加牢固的确立。在一种知识极简主义看来,知识朴素地是一种真信念。如果不被用作证据,那么一个真信念的好证据就一无所是;并且,即使它作为证据而使用,这种用法也只需要被解释为起到了一种原因的作用。这种作用可能是"从外部"产生知识——真信念。因此,这种证据也许不需要被视作"从内部"导出结果的知识的一部分——它至少是得到确证的信念。

One of the most epistemologically entrenched of all theses is that knowledge is more than a mere true belief. Knowledge, as thus standardly described, is at least an epistemically justified true belief, perhaps with the justification being good evidence. But that standard conception is more epistemologically entrenched than it should be. This paper defends an alternative picture—a knowledge-minimalism, on which knowledge is simply a true belief. Good evidence for a true belief is nothing if not being used as evidence; and, I propose, its use even as evidence need only be interpreted as playing a causal role. That role would be one of producing the knowledge—the true belief —‘ from without’. The evidence would not thereby need to be viewed as part of the resulting knowledge — what is at least the justified true belief —‘ from within’.