有检测误差的双合约逆向供应链定价策略研究

Price decision analysis for reverse supply chain considering checking errors and double contracts

将回收检测误差引入由单一回收商、拆解中心和再制造商构成的三级逆向供应链系统中,以是否满足再制造商对可再制造废旧产品的需求量为前提,设计了再制造商与拆解中心及拆解中心与回收商之间的惩罚合约;运用博弈论研究了由再制造商主导的有回收检测误差的逆向供应链定价策略。研究表明:当废旧产品的数量不满足再制造商需求时,双合约可以减少再制造商的损失;升级检测技术、提高检测准确性及减少回收检测误差不仅可以提高回收量、增加回收商利润,而且可以增加拆解中心与再制造商的利润。利用Matlab分析了回收检测误差对回收价格、回收数量及逆向供应链成员利润的影响。

This study considers a reverse supply chain with checking errors, comprising three independent companies ： the remanufaeturer, the disassembly center and the collector. In order to meet the quantity of used products, which can be remanufactured by remanufacturer, this paper designs the penalty contract between the remanufacturer and the disassembly center, and the penalty contract between the disassembly center and the collector. Game theory is used to study the Stackelberg equilibrium driven by the remanufacturer under the checking errors. The results indicate two conclusions. Firstly, double contracts can reduce the loss of remanufacturer when the quantity of used products can not meet the need of the remanufacturer. Secondly, upgrade checking technology can improve the accuracy and reduce the checking errors, which not only can improve collection quantity and profits of the collector, but also can increase the profits of the disassembly center and the remanufacturer. Therefore, this paper analyzes the influence of checking errors on the collecting price, the quantity of collection and the profits of the reverse supply chain members by Matlab.