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基于旁路环境下的密码芯片安全性评估 被引量:1

Cryptographic Chip Security Evaluation Based on Physically Observable Cryptography
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摘要 为在复杂旁路攻击敌手环境下对密码芯片进行安全评估,通过物理可观测密码术模型框架对旁路分析过程进行建模;借鉴传统面向实际的可证明安全性理论,定义旁路环境下的两类旁路敌手:密钥恢复旁路分析敌手与不可分辨性判定旁路分析敌手,并给出了密码实现针对这两类旁路敌手的安全性度量模型;对安全性评估中的重要参数指标进行定义与推导;最后根据旁路分析定义、模型及安全性度量指标,提出针对旁路分析的通用评估框架,为研究可抵抗旁路分析攻击的密码设备打下基础。 Side-channel attack avoids the complex cryptographic algorithm and tedious mathematical analysis,by analysising the physical information to crack the key and threats seriously about the security of cryptographic chip. It is important to build security system. Modeling in the basic of Physically Observable Cryptography,defining two adversaries:key recovery power attack and indistinguishable power attack. Defining the model of the two adversaries then define the safety assessment of important indicators. Finally,building a assessment framework according to the definition of side-channel analysis,model and security metrics and laid the foundations of further researching of resistant cryptographic system.
机构地区 军械工程学院
出处 《火力与指挥控制》 CSCD 北大核心 2017年第6期39-44,共6页 Fire Control & Command Control
基金 国家自然科学基金(51377170 61271152) 河北省自然科学基金资助项目(F2012506008)
关键词 密码芯片 旁路攻击 猜测熵 安全度量 cryptographic chip side-channel attack guessing entropy security metric
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